



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

Project Title:				
LL-01				
Interview Code:				
LL-01- [REDACTED]				
Date/Time:				
October 21, 2014; 10:00am-1:30pm				
Location:				
Washington, DC				
Purpose:				
SIGAR Attendees:				
Candace Rondeaux, Krisanne Campos				
Non-attribution Basis:	Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Recorded:	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Recording File Record Number:				
Prepared By: (Name, title and date)				
Krisanne Campos				
Reviewed By: (Name, title and date)				
Candace Rondeaux				
Key Topics:				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Background and roles related to Afghanistan • Indicators: Afghanistan is not going well • Iraq as a distraction • Interagency planning and coordination • Staffing policies and authorities • NSC roles, operations, and functionality • Perceptions of U.S.-led coalition • Role of personalities and structure in the NSC • Impediments to decisions during transition periods • Impact on planning and after-action review • OMB's role in the interagency • Poor preparation at the NSC • Issue of supplementals • Field-DC communication and coordination 				

If you're going to Carlisle, you should pay a visit to PKSOI. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Background and Roles



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

In early 2002 to mid 2003, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) because Secretary White was fired by Cheney. Someone didn't like the Secretary's comments and I'm convinced that he came into the office in the morning and had no idea he would be fired by the afternoon. So I was working (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) for several years (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) until someone was nominated to backfill him. I couldn't have had a better mentor regarding how the U.S. government functions. He served 25 years in the army and 16 years on the Senate Armed Services Committee, also serving as the Staff Director. He had an encyclopedic understanding of how the Senate and Congress worked. I worked 16 months with him spanning the first successes in Afghanistan to the ultimate decision to go to Iraq through the initial successes in Iraq. I traveled with him to Iraq in April/May of 2003. At that time, there was a relative peace and calm in Iraq that was probably a veneer. We traveled all over the country fairly easily.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
I attended meetings with the Chief of Staff and secretaries every morning and watched intelligence and operations at a level that interfaced with interagency issues. Because of Brownlee's background and connections, I pricelessly watched how the Pentagon interacted with Capitol Hill.

I was then a student at NDU for a year and following that worked with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Division Chief for Southeast Asia during the tsunami. I then moved over to (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) but then the Pakistani earthquake happened and we focused there, drawing back on the tsunami experience a few years earlier.

I was then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Competing for attention with Afghanistan/Pakistan were issues going on in North Korea and the East China Sea. However, since I had invested a fair amount of time already in Afghanistan, I watched it very closely.

In the summer of 2007, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

General Lute was War Czar at the time. He had been J3 and worked with J5 (General Sattler). Lute sent out a request to his general officer buddies in the Pentagon to see if they knew anyone who understood Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Remember, the whole "War Czar" position was new. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) there was a moderately sized Iraq team effective within the NSC, but there was only one person on the Afghanistan team. This was Tony Harriman. Kurt Amend had been there, too, and left to go back to DOS. (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) take Tony's place when we were asked to form an interagency Afghanistan team of seven.

(b)(5)



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

(b)(5)

By 2007, it was clear that Afghanistan was not going well.

Indicators: Afghanistan not going well

Well, first, the violence levels. That's probably what grabs everyone's attention. Second, the locations of the increase in violence – how it was spreading, what the intensity was. Third, the nature of the violence. Fourth, the capacity and/or willingness of the Kabul government to take on these challenges.

By 2007, there was a real doubt about whether the idea to turn the mission over to NATO was a good idea at all. There was a difference between standing up a coalition versus turning command and control over to NATO. More specifically regarding why the U.S. and Department of Defense were anxious for someone else to take a robust leading role in Afghanistan, it was so we could have greater resources and capability to prioritize Iraq.

We can't just say we sold NATO allies a bill of goods. We need to look at the situation in Afghanistan in 2003-2004: it looked spectacularly good. It looked, briefly, like a peacekeeping mission was a plausible argument. And the senior leadership in NATO was very anxious to get involved in something outside Europe and become relevant again. You should speak with General Jones and ask what the real thinking inside NATO headquarters was at the time regarding their increased role. You should also talk to the U.S. Ambassador to NATO [Victoria Nuland?] from the mid 2000s regarding this question.

NATO was anxious to expand their role, and so were people inside DOS and DOD working on European/NATO directorates who were suddenly important again. It was all smoke and mirrors, cloak and dagger with them trying to figure out what European nations had to offer, whether they were telling us the truth about their resources and other issues in trying to get nations to participate.

Iraq as a distraction

From early spring 2002, during my time at the Secretary's office, until 2011, Afghanistan *has* to be looked at with one eye on what is happening in Iraq. Even in the early and tail end (2009-2011) days, either materially or politically, it all seemed to be about Iraq.

It was hard to come to terms with the reality that your whole portfolio is a secondary effort or, at worst, an "economy of force" mission. ***Your job was not to win, it was to not lose.*** Emotionally and psychologically, this is hard, especially for the type-A people working on this thinking they are going in to win a war, but you're just expected to not lose it. We are bleeding resources away as things get worse in Iraq, and we were looking for more ways to make do in Afghanistan.

Indicators: in hindsight, there was a window between late 2002-2003 and early 2005 where there was relative peace in Afghanistan. The Taliban was on its heels and people were not that disillusioned. They were receiving a fair amount of money from the U.S. and the international community was spending a considerable amount of money on development and reconstruction. The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan [Zalmay Khalilzad] argued and had a long leash and the amount of money going in for



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

development in 2004-2005 was high. It was something in the billions going in at the end of Ambassador Khalilzad's tour.

Ambassador Neumann arrived and Iraq was going downhill. Money for Afghanistan was slashed dramatically, more than halved by the time Secretary Rice pushed the budget through. Psychologically, the building expectations in Afghanistan were unsustainable. The rate of money coming in was unsustainable. It was an absorptive capacity problem. Even if you continue the same rate of increase in funding, the ability to absorb that money plateaus. I'm convinced that the U.S. thought Afghanistan had the ability to keep improving at the same rate of funding – it didn't. There was a high level of dependency and expectation built in Afghanistan, and at the time when funding was dialed back was about the same time as the reemergence of the Taliban.

At the same time, Secretary Rumsfeld's decision not to backfill a departing military unit appeared as a withdrawal of troops, which created feelings that the U.S. was leaving in 2005. He ultimately flip-flopped on this issue but this was the same time we started to also transition over to NATO. It looked like we were leaving.

Michael O'Hanlon at Brookings should have good charts up until about 2009. Also, take a look at [Dr. Kimberly] Kagan's Institute for the Study of War.

[The US ability to sustain a two-front war] was an illusion. It was important for public consumption and public diplomacy for it to seem like we could sustain this, but we haven't been able to do this since the 1950s.

A tech-oriented force is not cheap and there are major challenges associated with asymmetrical warfare. For example, SOF guys need to track down terrorists with a gun but are also required to be proficient with the more high-tech parts of war. This type of training and expertise is expensive to keep up.

As for ISIS, our need to have both conventional and guerilla fighting capabilities at the same time and the savvy to know when to use one versus the other is very challenging. I'm not sure we've faced an enemy as adept at toggling between the two before – their ability to slide from one tactic to another.

So why is it hard to think about a two-front war? WWII was a conventional fight in both theaters and we faced formed forces of defined nation states. Even a two-front war concept conjures up well-defined lines and states. This is not the case anymore, with Korea as a major exception.

Interagency Planning and Coordination

So do you structure yourself to preclude or react to a major crisis? If to preclude, you invest considerable efforts into civilian and non-traditional intelligence planning and scenario gaming capacity in departments and agencies outside DOD. I'm biased toward DOD, but if you talk to DOS/USAID professionals and ask if they have structured planning and capacity akin to DOD, they would say no. They may say DOS culture is biased against structured planning.



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

It may be that [if you game it, you expect it]. Every year we run a week-long seminar for senior diplomats from abroad for training. Senior DOS staff asked why is it that, even in well-formed teams, the military attaché would rub up against the diplomats? Well, it's because the military guys spend their entire career trying to drive out ambiguity to best define a situation and array efforts against it. Diplomats *like* ambiguity and even inject it in for diplomatic maneuvering. The two approaches are diametrically opposed. I think there might be something to that in terms of being averse to planning. But how often do they hold up George Kennan and Mr. X regarding containment?

If we are trying to shape policy in advance, and make it more civilian led and non-DOD centric, capacity needs to go up in DOS, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce. So take the budget share out of defense and inject it into these agencies. But this can also spin out of control: Congress doesn't want Agriculture to spend their increased budget in Afghanistan, but in America. I don't know, but his [random congressmen's] constituents want aid *now*.

But we don't have to call everyone; several members of key committees. We haven't been wholly unsuccessful. If you look at the Agriculture budget now versus early 2000-2002, evolutionarily it is moving in the right direction. But I'm not sure it's reached an inflection point where we have agency capacity forward-looking in this respect. The posture to preclude is different than to react.

Staffing Policies and Authorities

There could have been authorities in place. There was an interest in trying to do more for the agricultural sector. But there's a difference between having the ability to send and having ability to compel staff to go over to Afghanistan. Look at the civilian surge condition in Iraq with Secretary Rice versus how she deferred on a civilian surge in Afghanistan. She backed away from compelling DOS personnel to go to Kabul. They didn't have enough personnel, and there were only so many with the right skill set. They drained the bench when they sent personnel to Iraq and this was a high price to pay as a secretary. DOS had to ask: how can we execute this? We don't have enough people to send to Afghanistan. Where should we cut people from other posts?

There was a long-standing concern regarding the agricultural sector, the Afghan economy and using an improvement in the agricultural sector to counter narcotics production. This was a simplistic vision – there were of course issues getting goods to market, supply chain problems, etc. But set this aside. Everyone was interested in making the agricultural sector more robust. DOD likes this because people would be farming instead of shooting at them.

[From 2007-2008 or a bit earlier?] There was a degree of frustration in the Pentagon that we didn't get more agricultural experts in Afghanistan. DOD went to the National Guard units and looked within them for agricultural experts, forming Agribusiness Development Teams (?) These teams were activated and deployed for their agricultural expertise. These were Guard members who, in their civilian life, were agricultural experts. They were under OSD order and deployed like any other unit. Their job was to work with farmers and Ministers of Agriculture regarding irrigation and livestock. They usually did this on a district level. Their deployment order was signed by the Secretary of Defense and they were sent over.



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

Inside DOD, there was both a legal compulsion authority and capacity to scratch this itch. There is a good story to be told about the flexibility and ability to put these units together.

There was a negative effect, too: over six, eight, ten years, DOD became tired of waiting for other agencies to do [projects like] this. DOD then takes on non-DOD roles because they can do the job quickly. So the question is, do you want an 80% solution now or do you want to wait five years [for the other agencies to act] and have a 100% solution? DOD filled a vacuum.

There's a question about why they are not yet doing x,y,z within the Department of Agriculture. Agriculture doesn't have anyone to do this and does not have the mission to do this. Not that they don't want to, but they're not set up for this particular mission.

To the extent that Commerce deployed overseas, they did so mainly for American businesses, not to build Afghan capacity. This changed over the last ten years but probably not to the extent needed [under Executive branch authority].

Now you have to discuss national mobilization. How do you mobilize a total effort? There are authorities used.

[The Afghanistan Reach Back Office]

There is 3161 hiring authority across the executive branch for Afghanistan. And if they're not going to compel FSOs or military, can't we direct-hire and then deploy? This then becomes a money issue regarding more direct-hires. One of the last actions taken by Bush in late 2008 was 3162 hiring authority. I don't recall if much was done with this authority after it was approved and signed because from January-March of 2009, the executive branch was in transition.

[NSC was responsible for these decisions on policy]. But my principal vantage point is from my Afghanistan experience, so this may not be universally applicable outside Afghanistan or Iraq. It could be unique to these.

NSC roles, operations, and functionality

In many cases, a deficiency is identified in the field, through the military or DOS, and may come up through AIOG (Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group), which served the function of a sub-IPC. AIOG met once per week and served as a mechanism through which issues could percolate up. It could be that the problem or area identified for additional emphasis at the time it is percolating may not be fully understood to the point of making a poorly informed decision that gets to the deputy level that then gets to NSC for coordination. The issue would need to get to the deputy level because they would know the rules of the game. For example, an issue may be addressed to a particular deputy and he or she may respond, "I would love to do that, but I have no authority to," and surprisingly no one else at the table would know that fact until it came up at the meeting. It was experiential learning. Look at this example to see how the NSC is structured: not linearly. At each level, there is a continuous churn. An issue might get to the deputies and then they say this issue is impossible to handle this way. Go back and think



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

about it. I remember one colleague presented a paper in this manner 21 different times. It is not a sterile system that things pass through. There's lots of iteration.

The urgency and scale of Afghanistan and Iraq make the process a bit different. Also, it depends on the issue and how or whether we dealt with something similar before, procedurally speaking (existing legislation that came out of a similar issue before, for example). In this case, there may need to be negotiation on the Hill regarding amendments to such legislation.

(b)(5)



The president can only pay attention to so many things at once. You have to package issues as a crisis to carve out the president's time. And the president shouldn't have to be making these kinds of decisions; he should be surrounded by people who can on his behalf.

We need to guard against routine meetings becoming too routine. For instance, it's important to focus on Afghan government capacity because we have guys getting shot at that need improvement in this area. But we also don't want meetings about an important and recurring issue like this to be so routine that people get lazy about them.

Lamm/Barno would say that the golden year was when Baro and Zal's offices were next to each other; great country team and coordination. But others would say that this was nothing special. Ambassador-military coordination was good under others, too. Relationships between senior representatives in DC and not necessarily ambassador/senior military commanders but at least the DCM and deputy heads and military equivalents need to be strong because every issue someone is asking about in DC generally can't be answered in DC. You needed to be very careful when briefing the president because you didn't want bad info/policy to pass down to the field. What looks like an important question here may be considered differently in the field.

It's also important not to have a constant drone of reporting requirements. The 1230 Report: Congress wanted a quarterly report, which looks innocuous on the surface but the amount of people and constant drum beat of putting it together took away from the mission. In 2004-2005, Rumsfeld requested a weekly update on Afghanistan and Iraq with the desire for the two reports to be identical in their portrayal of data. Two people's jobs were to daily or twice daily dialogue with Afghanistan and CENTCOM to make sure they were portraying information *visually* the same way to Rumsfeld. In fact, I walked into their office one day and noticed the word "MILLI" written on a sign on their wall. I asked the report guys what it meant, and they said, "Make It Look Like Iraq." Instead of requiring so much information in such a specific format, you need relationships where you can pick up the phone regarding the exact questions you have and know who to call to get them answered.

[Mentioned (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the DCM in Afghanistan].



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

[If the rotations are too short], or if the staff gets too big, bureaucracy overcomes. A small staff only can focus on what's truly important. But if demand from headquarters keeps asking for more staff increases, the ability to know who to contact within a given organization dissolves. At one point, there were 19 generals in ISAF headquarters, all from different countries. Every one of them had at least a few staffers. There were probably forty people in headquarters who were really not producing anything. [Too many people at once can be a problem, too.]

Perceptions of US-led Coalition

A lot [of discussion went on in the NSC about changing back to a U.S.-led coalition]. I spent a lot of personal time on the issue of the dual-hatted nature of the command. Under OEF, we still had CT units and authorization doing direct action. (b)(1) - (1.4)(c)

[REDACTED] The dual-hatting of the U.S.

Command therefore became a political issue. I had to express to the U.S. leadership why that was a political issue and what the military implications of the U.S. Commander in charge of the U.S. and ISAF forces at the same time meant. It was very complicated. We were exerting more influence over NATO in 2006-2007. We were examining how to move more toward a U.S.-Army centric command structure.

2007-2008: General McNeill arrived under the dual-hat arrangement, followed by General McKiernan. These roles morphed together and became less distinct.

(b)(5)
[REDACTED]

Role of personalities and structure in the NSC

Absolutely [suggests a personality-driven system]. Hadley was a real gentleman. His demeanor and approach as National Security Advisor was not to be the center of attention. He sat at the president's chair during meetings, but was deferential and inclusive of everyone around the table. He was collegial and credited people for their ideas when communicating with the higher-ups.

Yeah, for the most part [it was easy regarding questions of authority of OEF to convince the National Security Advisor to tackle these problems up front]. I never found it difficult to get Hadley to listen to us. There was always a willingness to listen to us, although our conversations were not necessarily going to percolate upward. He often said, "This is half-baked. Go back and rethink it; this needs more thought." Or he would say, "Ok, here are the three questions the president will ask. So what are our answers?"



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

There was really an amazing structure under Bush and Scowcroft and it has remained intact. Within the NSC there is the Principals Committee, the Deputy Committee, and the PPC/PCs. This general structure has stood the test of time. The staffing structure depends on the preference of the president or the National Security Advisor or both. The NSC is larger now than in the past, but not so large that it seems crazy. When it was established in 1947, the authorizing legislation had only one person as permanent staff: the Executive Secretary. This was the only permanent position that originally fell under the Executive Office of the President, so otherwise the president can establish the staff how they want to. The Executive Secretary position does still exist – they run the situation room, organize papers, etc. Now, within that authority, there is still a small handful of senior staff/technical staff that are also usually present under each administration. This includes the Senior Director of Records and Administration. The person who served in this position when I was there was in it for 25 years. He made sure papers sent to the president were formatted correctly, maintained them for historical record, forwarded them to the presidential library, etc.

There were 50-60 fairly senior people who were political appointees that were brought in from virtually any field because of their expertise in some area of national security policy. Then the vast masses were detailees from agencies or departments for a two-year period. Generally these appointments are only two years for accounting reasons. If the White House wants a detailee to stay longer, the Executive Office of the President needs to find room out of their budget to reimburse the agency or department paying the detailee. People who came as detailees were and are apolitical. They are experts and have vast networks within their departments and know their people. You need to leave your agency loyalties at the door to serve the president and the NSC staff.

Jones asked, “Why detailees?” and I told him that we would lose interdepartmental understanding and expertise on executing policy if we bring in outsiders. Additionally, bringing in outsiders runs the risk of politicizing the staff. Ultimately, the decision was to keep the process mostly with detailees. That is just my two cents, but I think it’s a fairly good system.

Impediments to decisions during transition period

There are structured rules regarding what kinds of documents can be retained. There are laws regarding presidential records; basically everything for the outgoing president is boxed up and gone by the time the incoming president arrives. But Hadley was really good and put together a process with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) the Executive Secretary of NSC, where each directorate would prepare a memo for the incoming secretary’s team to make for a smoother transition and create a big continuity book for Donilon, Emmanuel, etc. But there are strict rules for what you can’t hand off. There are a certain number of documents (10?) that each directorate could seek permission of the White House Counsel to transfer between presidencies to bridge continuity with records. Otherwise, these records are filed away. I remember around the 16/17 of January 2009, our hard drives disappeared for cataloguing in some repository.

Impact on Planning and After-Action Review



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

It helped that people in prominent positions, especially Hadley, had gone through a transition before. The transition books and paper writing were products of his experience with this. Although Bush and Obama politically were in direct opposition with each other, it was in the best interest of the nation that the transition needed to be as smooth as possible. Bush and Hadley would have crucified us if anyone had tried to obstruct information flows between one administration to the other. It takes strong leadership from the top of the organization to ensure that this happens. If the staffing of the NSC is too politicized, and these types of decisions become politicized, it is bad for the people of the U.S. and the wellbeing of the country.

What I will say about the new NSC staff under Obama in the first six months is that they were simply inexperienced. [An example of how this played out:]

President Obama came in on January 20th and an NSC meeting on Iraq was held the 21st and on Afghanistan on the 22nd or 23rd. (b)(5)

[REDACTED]

The job of the whipping boys [was to educate the new senior staff]. I would dispassionately sit there and let a guy rip my face off until he eventually learned the process. They were generally distrustful of us [carry-overs from Bush administration], and I think we were there because Jones argued to keep a team there for continuity.

The point of the example is that I thought our workable system at NSC from 2008 would flow and work in 2009. This was not so, and not because of the president, but from the staff underneath him. Donilon was under intense pressure to keep troop numbers down and make it work. But I'd guess the administration isn't this in the weeds anymore. They are probably more approximate now, as it was under Bush.

OMB's role in the interagency process



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

From a macro-level perspective, I could have meetings about an issue, but it never became serious until OMB showed up. Policy discussions are ok, but to actually *do* something costs money. Generally, you're not seeking a new appropriation, but need to rip off of someone else for your budget. When OMB shows up at a deputy-level discussion, it's time to bring the principals into the room. *Now* there is serious policy work going on. Shame on you as an NSC staffer if you didn't do the preliminary work and consult with OMB early-on. But this is not a natural outreach. While the senior OMB official is sitting in a big corner office nearby, OMB staffers are not in the building, so it is not as natural to speak with them; it takes effort.

Poor preparation at the NSC

(b)(5)
[Redacted text block]

[Redacted text block]

Issue of Supplementals

We were told in 2005, "No more supplementals." Yeah, right. Say you are a crack addict and you know that a year from now, it would be really good to not do crack any more. But when a year from now comes around, you'll be looking for a fix. What you're really saying is that you have to fundamentally reprioritize how important the issue is. If it *is* that important, it should be on-budget. If it is part of the core, existential well-being of the United States, it needs to be on-budget. Philosophically, I am on board that supplementals are only for a short period of time (2-4 years) until you figure out how to incorporate it into the actual budget. But this is a high-order priority question: What it really means is asking the president what he is truly willing to do without.

But even if you don't have a contingency fund, you'll have to slash someone else's budget to address this in a time of crisis. Look at AfPak Hands. Absolutely crazy idea. We were fixing yesterday's problem. In 2009, the idea was first kicked around. I met with a group at the Pentagon and said, "This is an unsustainable approach." We will not fight for 20 years in Af/Pak. The incentive structure was bad. You put personnel through the program, they're deployed to Afghanistan, alternate to a placement of their choice, and then go back to Afghanistan. This might work for the first or second iteration of the plan, but by the third iteration guys would know how ill-prepared we are to fulfill these promises of placing them in their desired slots.



Lessons Learned Record of Interview

What we need is a much deeper bench and a design bench. We're slowly seeing within the services that a Cold War career path is not the definition of success for the future. Admiral Mullen got this. He was commanding the operation when PRTs were going into Iraq. When there were not enough people, he volunteered Navy Commanders to the Pentagon to fill the slots. But he would demand that the Navy and others see the PRT command as equivalent to service at sea. He demonstrated expansive thinking about how to treat service and how to think of service. He made clear that we need to relook at the importance of these types of roles in light of an asymmetric-type war.

There wasn't a weekly AIOG update. It was mostly done through unofficial emails. (b)(5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] You should try to look at the 1230 reports to Congress, first issued in 2008. There was also a set of slides presented to Secretary Rumsfeld on a bi-weekly basis synchronized with Iraq. They indicated the relevant statistics and intelligence at least through 2007. I'm not sure what reporting was required for DOS, but usually there was a solid stream of cables, maybe organized thematically. The most easily accessible information for a macro glimpse is budgetary money data and the lines of appropriation. There were at least 43-47 different appropriation lines in total. Christa Skerry-White, who is now Deputy Administrator of USAID, in 2008 took on the task of discovering all of the money. What we ultimately wanted to do at the macro level was figure out how to redirect the spigot. This is a scary thought to people in the field. She was looking at appropriations to departments within agencies, too. The fund information is part of public records, but her analysis is not. She probably got the original information from OMB. We thought there were just Title 10, Title 22, (b)(1) - (1.4)(d) funding but there were more than 40 categories! Keep in mind that it is not in people's interest to tell you how the money actually flows. In December of 2008, we were finally on the cusp of being able to talk about what [budgetary] tradeoffs we could consider, and then the transition happened.

As for the pol-mil plan designed in the context of PDD56, I don't ever remember referencing it unfortunately. But the question about getting deputies to focus on implementation is a great one. When Lute structured Iraq/Afghanistan, he focused on two major efforts: one on policy development and one on policy implementation. Development is far easier than implementation. Policy decision-making is sexy, while implementation can be mind-numbing. I think the deputies' human nature made them want to focus more on the decision-making piece rather than implementation. The transformative nature of implementation is not as gripping for front page coverage in the *Washington Post* as major new policy decisions. At the IPC level, people would talk about implementation, but not really at the Deputy Committee level.

Field-DC Communication and Coordination

There were great feedback mechanisms [from the field]. There is almost nothing not knowable; it's just a matter of who knows it and knowing who that person is. This can become more of a problem with a large staff. Conversely, it is also difficult when a small universe of people is asked to weigh in on a huge



This administration needs to remember that giving a speech is *not* implementing a policy. Implementing a policy requires some fudging and doing deals with the devil so long as you are moving in the cardinal direction of the president's speech. The president doesn't need to know the details, but it needs to be done.

Follow-up: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Follow-up: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)